This post is one of those papers that I wrote in my last semester of college. Majoring in philosophy was probably one of the best things I ever did as it exposed me to so many different thoughts and ideas that I never would have been exposed to otherwise. It also forced me to tighten up my reasoning and writing. But, enough reminiscing. This post examines three different reforms to democracy. If one is not at least a little familiar with the literature of political philosophy in regard to democratic reform, then this post might be slightly confusing. However, I think I do a decent enough job explaining most of the major concepts.
In this paper (blog post?), I will argue that secret voting in Congress is the best way to reform democracy. In order to illustrate this, first, I will go over two other potential democratic reforms. Specifically, Jason Brennan’s epistocracy and Christopher Freiman’s vote markets. Second, I will explain the problems these reforms seek to fix, but ultimately why they both fail. Lastly, I will introduce the democratic reform that is most compelling, in this case, secrecy in Congress, including what it seeks to fix and why it is superior to the first two reforms I discuss.
In his book, Against Democracy, Jason Brennan comprehensively
highlights and demonstrates the severe lack of political competence that voters
have today. This, he argues, is a consequence of the democratic process as
utilized in the United States and other democracies around the world. The
average voter, with little incentive to become politically competent, remains
rationally ignorant. The effects of this rational ignorance are poor voting
habits and poor political outcomes. In an effort to reform the shortcomings of
democracy, Brennan argues for several versions of epistocracy. That is, a
political system in which the voices of the competent are amplified, while the
voices of the incompetent are eliminated, or at least greatly subdued.
There are four main versions of epistocracy that Brennan makes a
case for. The first and simplest of which being restricted suffrage. Just as
one must take a driver’s test to determine whether or not they are capable of
handling the risks associated with it, Brennan suggests that one must also take
a test to determine whether or not they are sufficiently competent to vote. In
restricted suffrage then, political power is restricted to those
citizens who can pass a test, demonstrating they possess the requisite
knowledge.[1] Simple
and straightforward, restricted suffrage would achieve Brennan’s goal of only
the competent wielding political power
Hand in hand with the restricted suffrage proposal is the proposal
of John Stuart Mill, defended by Brennan, called plural voting. In this regime,
each citizen has one vote by default, although as Brennan mentions it could
also be zero, and through specific actions that demonstrate competence, they
are given more votes.[2]
The actions that allow citizens to obtain more votes could be by passing an
exam or holding an advanced degree amongst other things.
Brennan also presents a hybrid political system called universal
suffrage with epistemic veto.[3] As
the name suggests, in this scheme, everyone would have the ability to vote, but
there would be an epistemic council that would have the ability to veto political
decisions. The council would be open to any citizen who demonstrates the requisite
knowledge through “rigorous competency exams.”[4]
Importantly, the council has no power to make law, it can only unmake
law, it cannot start political action, it can only stop it.[5]
Additionally, the council cannot appoint its members or issue any decrees or
regulations.
Lastly, Brennan suggests government by simulated oracle.
In this regime, people in the electorate are split into groups based on their demographics.
A test is then given to everyone. The people who pass the test cast votes for
themselves and everyone else in their demographic that they represent.
Brennan’s arguments for political competence in an electorate are
reasonable, but the question that he and every other epistocrat must answer is
what makes one competent? In his estimation, for an electorate to be
politically competent, they must reason well, have relevant knowledge of
worldly events and goings on, as well as possess social scientific knowledge.[6]
Brennan makes a good attempt at defining competence, and thus, theoretically, making
the selection for epistocrats an easy, or easier, endeavor. But while reasoning
well, possessing social scientific knowledge, and having knowledge of current
events are all necessary components of competence, in my estimation, none of
them are sufficient by themselves or even when placed altogether.
Within Brennan’s epistocratic scheme, there is a glaring lack of
any moral knowledge needed to be competent as he understands. An epistocracy
that satisfies Brennan’s definition of competence still has the ability to
vote or impose immoral, unjust laws. Perhaps one could argue that reasoning
well itself means morality will be considered and implemented into any
important decisions. But reasoning well, as Brennan describes, has less to do
with coming to the correct conclusions, and more to do with avoiding cognitive
errors or mistakes in one’s reasoning.[7] In
other words, Brennan is much more concerned with how someone comes to a
conclusion rather than what conclusion they necessarily come to. In
fact, you could even argue that there may be situations in which the most
rational decisions have immoral outcomes. With this definition in mind, it
seems that possessing all of Brennan’s competence components can still lead to
unjust, immoral political outcomes.
Here, of course, is where epistocracy becomes difficult. Creating a
test or criterion for morality is an incredibly difficult task. Who determines
what theory of morality is correct? What type of questions would be included in
a morality test? Are both relevant questions whose answers do not seem clear.
Additionally, even if the ability to create a good test for morality is granted,
there is no way to test for someone’s ability or willingness to act on
morality. It is entirely possible for someone to understand the “moral” answer
to a question but have no intention of acting within that moral framework once they
have obtained power. Seeing as there is no way to conduct a reliable morality
test, and even if a reliable morality test is granted there is no way to test
whether someone will act on their moral knowledge or not, then finding the
people that satisfy all of Brennan's requirements of them plus the moral
knowledge required does not seem possible in reality.
Christopher Freiman offers a different reform for democracy. In his
paper, Vote Markets, Freiman argues for the legal and moral permissibility
of selling one’s vote. In order to prove his claim, he presents four prima facie
reasons for allowing vote markets. First, voting as understood today is not
efficient, vote markets would allow for efficiency as both seller and buyer of
a vote would be made better off. Second, voters already have the ability to use
their votes in ways antithetical to justice. Third, there are several
democratic processes that already exist and function similarly to vote markets,
and lastly, vote markets would allow citizens to express their preferences more
intensely.[8]
Freiman is correct. Voting as it exists today is not entirely
efficient, but while vote markets would undoubtedly increase efficiency, there
are other trade-offs that might make vote markets less than ideal. My argument
is simple and similar to Greg Mankiw’s as cited by Freiman, albeit slightly different.
Like any market, there will be externalities that negatively affect others
outside of the interaction between buyer and seller. Freiman comments that this
argument, while correct, proves too much as negative externalities can
be imposed on third parties even without vote markets. When people who
otherwise would not have voted are persuaded into voting this would also causes
negative externalities on third parties. Freiman takes this even further
arguing that voting itself causes negative externalities on third
parties who choose not to vote. Thus, negative externalities by themselves
cannot be a reason to prohibit vote markets.
This is where Freiman is wrong. Negative externalities can be
a reason for prohibiting vote markets by themselves. That is, there is one main
difference between the externalities caused by vote markets and the other type
of externality that Freiman mentions. Within a democracy there is merit in
deliberation about ideas. Deliberation is virtuous not just as a random
democratic ideal, but also, as Helene Landemore suggests, because of its tendency
to produce epistemically superior outcomes.[9] While
this may not happen as often as theorists like Landemore would like, the potential
for epistemically virtuous deliberation between individuals who voted or plan
on voting and those less inclined to vote would be occluded by or lost
completely were vote markets implemented.
Freiman’s second reason for allowing vote markets is that citizens already
have the right to wield their vote in ways antithetical to justice. Either
by voting selfishly or even by voting in direct contradiction of just ideals by
supporting and voting for racist candidates, for example.[10] Once
again, the argument is fairly simple. If a voter who is voting unjustly should
not be interfered with by the government or individuals, why should a voter be kept
from selling their vote? As stated in the beginning, Freiman is only providing prima
facie reasons for allowing vote markets, meaning that his arguments are
meant to simply shift the burden of proof from those who wish to allow vote
markets, to those who do not wish to allow them.
In this respect, Freiman is successful. But of course, there still might
be other reasons to disallow vote markets. Freiman provides some other
arguments that are connected to my objection to this argument, so I will
discuss them in more depth toward the end of this section.
Freiman’s third reason is that there are already certain practices
that are functionally the same as vote selling that are allowed. Examples of
this would be logrolling or earmarking. As Freiman describes, “logrolling occurs
when a legislator secures the vote of another legislator on his favored
legislation in exchange for offering his vote on behalf of her favored
legislation.”[11]
This is functionally equivalent to selling a vote and yet is still allowed.
Similarly, earmarking is when public funds are allocated to specific projects
or recipients with the intent of winning that portion of the population's vote.[12] Again,
Freiman argues that since these practices are functionally the same as buying
votes and are allowed under our current democratic scheme, then vote markets
should be allowed as well.
While Freiman is correct that these practices are functionally the
same as buying votes in a vote market, that does not that these practices are
good in and of themselves. It is possible that they are also deficient
mechanisms that should be done away with. In fact, Freiman even mentions that
there are some cases where practices like logrolling are illegal. Additionally,
earmarking, while similar to vote buying in function does not guarantee that
the recipients who get public funds allocated toward them will vote for the
specific legislator come election time. Whereas the ability to buy a vote would
guarantee the use of that vote for the candidate of the buyer. This is a
significant difference. Similar to the argument of negative externalities, the potential
for a recipient or group of recipients of earmarked funds to vote against the
legislators that earmarked those funds for them is an important possibility to
preserve.
Finally, Freiman suggests that vote markets allow for more intense
preference expression on behalf of the voter. The basic argument is that voter
who is truly committed to a specific cause or candidate will be able to more
intensely express that preference in the number of votes that they buy up.
My response to Freiman’s second and final reason for allowing vote
markets, and vote markets more generally, is fairly simple. Like many people,
the biggest intuition and worry about implementing vote markets would be the
advantage that the wealthy may wield over the poor. Even a more intense
expression of preference might only be available to those wealthy enough to buy
a significant chunk of votes. Freiman also admits that status quo, there is
plenty of evidence to suggest that the wealthy exert more political power than their
poorer counterparts.[13] Thus,
perhaps further advantaging the rich over the poor is not an ideal we should
strive towards. Freiman calls this the “Equality Argument”.[14]
Freiman’s overall argument against this intuition is two-pronged
and slightly complex. If we accept that even without vote markets the wealthy
still wield political power over the poor, then we must also accept that this advantage
of the wealthy lessens the legitimacy of our democratic institutions and should
be prohibited. This a fairly intuitive response and most people would agree
that if such inequalities exist, then regulations should be implemented to
improve the legitimacy of democracy. Freiman then argues that if we accept the
efficacy of regulations in our current political system, then this only strengthens
the case for markets. In other words, if there is a possibility of regulations
improving egalitarian criteria status quo, then there must also be the
possibility of regulations improving egalitarian criteria in vote markets.
On the face of it, this response is very compelling. After further inspection, however, there is one problem with Freiman’s
reasoning. The major issue in Freiman’s reasoning is that he assumes that the
ban on vote markets is not itself a regulation improving egalitarian
criteria. It becomes difficult to see why a world with vote markets would succeed
just as well with regulations on the wealthy if the very regulation to improve
egalitarian criteria, a ban on vote markets, has been eliminated. If there is a
world in which a ban on vote markets cannot be implemented, then I am not
sure how Freiman can conclude that regulation in both worlds would be equally
as efficacious. Thus, the Equality Argument can still counter Freiman’s
argument for vote markets based on this fact.
Finally, Brian Kogelmann offers the most compelling reform for
democracy. In his book, Secret Government, Kogelmann offers what is, in
my estimation, the best reform to democracy. Contra philosophers like
Christiano and Rawls who believe in publicity or the seeing of justice being
done as a democratic ideal, Kogelmann offers a defense for more secrecy
in government. The ideal of one person, one vote is critical to democracy, but it
is not by itself enough to establish a normatively attractive conception
of democracy.[16]
Thus, as Kogelmann argues, in order to establish more political equality, we
must have more secrecy in government. While somewhat counterintuitive,
Kogelmann argues that secrecy effectively does away with two major obstacles to
political equity, campaign contributions and information asymmetry.
As similarly noted by Freiman, campaign contributions are
impediments to political equality because not every citizen can offer as much
money to political campaigns as lobbyists and special interest groups can. Due
to this, there is an inequality in whose interests will primarily be
considered. Secrecy eliminates does away with the commitment problem that Kogelmann
calls “credible commitments.”[17]
In other words, due to secrecy, campaigns will be disincentivized to contribute
large amounts of money to political campaigns. This disincentive is based on
the fact that secrecy eliminates the mechanism through which credible
commitments are resolved.[18] Similarly,
secrecy addresses the problem of information asymmetry amongst voters.
While admittedly counterintuitive, the following claims can best be
understood through an example. In terms of campaign contributions, imagine a
scenario in which two people, A, and B each have one vote for themselves, but B
has their interests considered more than A because of B's monetary contribution
to a political campaign, for example. As congress is now, B not only has an
incentive to donate to the campaigns that she votes for, but the official whose
campaign B contributed to, because their decisions will be seen, also has an
incentive to fulfill B's desire, even at the expense of A. But, Kogelmann
argues, if we lived in a society where there was more opacity as it pertained
to government decision-making, B would be less likely to try and monetarily influence
political outcomes because there would be no way for B to know if her money was
put to good use or not.
In terms of information asymmetry, or “leveling down” information,
as Kogelmann calls it, secrecy does not let B leverage her information over A. If
B is more up-to-date on politics than A, and therefore more closely monitors
specific legislators, it only makes sense that the legislators will be more
responsive to B’s desires. This is because if they do not address them, B will
actually do something about it, whereas A, who is so busy and bogged down with
work will not be able to consistently hold her legislator accountable[19].
If there were secrecy in Congress, then this information playing field gets
leveled, and a legislator no longer has to be more responsive to B’s desires
than A’s, because B can no longer apply pressure for her to vote in a specific
way. Contrary to most commonly held intuitions, more secrecy actually seems to
create more political equality, rather than less.
In my estimation, Kogelmann’s reform for democracy is better than
Brennan’s and Freiman’s, although for different reasons. While sympathetic to
Brennan’s lament about voter ignorance, simply on grounds of feasibility I find
it hard to imagine the implementation of any form of epistocracy as Brennan
imagines. Perhaps there is some formulation of epistocracy that could exist
without the concerns that I mentioned, but Kogelmann’s reform seems to provide
a much more feasible improvement to democracy that Brennan’s proposal of
epistocratic government cannot. Freiman’s proposal suffers from a different
weakness. Inherent in them, vote markets simply have an issue of inequality that
one, Freiman does not adequately argue against and two, is more adequately
addressed by secrecy. Even if we granted that vote markets could actually apply
regulation to improve egalitarian criteria, secrecy also corrects for the gap
in political influence between rich and poor without any drawbacks like
deliberation occluding externalities.
[1]Jason Brennan, Against
Democracy, pg. 212
[2] Ibid, pg. 213
[3] Ibid, pg. 215
[4] Ibid, pg. 216
[5] Ibid, pg. 216
[6]
Ibid, pg. 37-40;
83
[7] Ibid., pg. 37-40;
141: As explicated in his competence principle (and other points in the book) Brennan
does not seem to emphasize coming to the “correct” conclusion, but rather reasoning
well, avoiding errors and cognitive biases, and making decisions in “good
faith”
[8] Christopher
Freiman, Vote Markets, pg. 761
[9] Helene
Landemore, Democratic Reason, pg. 90
[10] Christopher
Freiman, Vote Markets, pg. 763
[11] Ibid, pg. 765
[12] Ibid, pg. 765
[13] Ibid, pg. 767
[14] Ibid, pg. 766
[16]
Brian
Kogelmann, Secret Government, pg. 37
[17] Ibid, pg. 49
[18] Ibid, pg. 52
[19] Ibid, pg. 57: Importantly,
Kogelmann uses this example in regard to interest groups not being able to
leverage information against the general public, but I thought an interpersonal
example between A and B would be easier to understand.
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